WASHINGTON -- The United States is working with nations in Northeast Asia to interdict any nuclear material that might leave North Korea, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 25).
Following North Korea's Oct. 9 test of a nuclear device, President George W. Bush said the transfer of nuclear material or weapon technology to states or nonstate entities would be considered a "grave threat" and that the United States would hold Pyongyang "fully accountable" for such efforts.
"On this front, we are working with nations in the region to design a practical architecture for detection and screening of radioactive materials," Rice said during an address at the Heritage Foundation. She did not provide details of the detection system.
Rice just returned from a trip through China, Japan, Russia and South Korea to marshal support for implementation of the Oct. 14 U.N. Security Council resolution adopted unanimously as a response to the nuclear test.
"The United States and our friends and allies are expanding measures to defend against North Korea's proliferation efforts," she said. "In every capital that I visited last week, we held extensive discussions on how we can best implement Resolution 1718."
In addition to condemning the nuclear test, the resolution calls for inspecting cargo entering and leaving the country. China, Russia and South Korea have all agreed to "fully and effectively" implement the measure, Rice said.
Experts have expressed concern that North Korea could transfer either nuclear material or nuclear technology. The regime has a long track record of transferring sensitive weapon technology.
North Korea is world's most prolific exporter of ballistic missiles, related equipment, technology and supplies, according to a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank. Over the past 20 years, North Korea has sold hundreds of missiles and other equipment worth several hundred million dollars, primarily to countries in Middle East, according to the group. Buyers of North Korean missiles have included Iran, Libya, Pakistan and Syria.
One tool available to stanch North Korean trade in weapon technology is the Proliferation Security Initiative -- "a voluntary partnership among nations to prevent the spread by air, by sea and by land of weapons of mass destruction and related materials," Rice said (see GSN, Oct 18).
Bush announced the program in May 2003. It now, according to Rice, includes 80 nations as formal members.
"The main focus of this initiative is to share information and to help partner countries build their capacities to better police their own territories and waters," Rice said. "In an international context, the goal is to act on good intelligence and enforce international law."
Often cited by the administration as one of the program's successes is the October 2003 interdiction of the BBC China, a ship headed to Libya with a cargo of uranium centrifuge components. Germany and Italy, acting on British and U.S. intelligence, intercepted the ship in transit from Malaysia.
Libya later relinquished its unconventional weapons programs, including its nuclear research, after years of intransigence and playing an adversarial role on the international stage.
Intelligence is integral to preventing the transfer of any nuclear material, said Michael Levi, a nuclear weapons expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Stopping fissile material from passing through an international dragnet is not so much about sophisticated radiological detection devices but rather about knowing which containers to inspect, he said.
While a tighter ring around North Korea might have been on the U.S. wish list for some time, the nuclear test and U.N. resolution have provided an avenue to that goal. "The United States may have wanted to ring North Korea with detection systems for a long time but only now sees it a viable political possibility," Levi said.
Despite the best hopes for a complete cordon around North Korea, actually stopping nuclear material from leaving the country is a terribly difficult task, noted Ashton Carter, assistant defense secretary under President Bill Clinton.
"It is incredible to me that we will know or detect or find a North Korean weapon in transit if they choose to put one in transit," Carter said during an address last week in Washington.
Highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the two fissile materials that fuel nuclear weapons, can be difficult to detect by radioactive signatures alone. "They're just chunks of metal," Carter said. "It's real tough. These are not highly radioactive materials."
The device detonated by North Korea earlier this month was fueled by plutonium. The United States in the early 2000s charged that North Korea was also operating a clandestine uranium enrichment program (see GSN, Oct. 17).
"The idea that we're going to encircle North Korea with an impermeable boundary and check everything that comes out -- I mean come on," Carter said. "That's completely implausible."
Still, Carter said he doubted that North Korea would transfer nuclear material or technology to al-Qaeda. The terrorist group and Kim Jong Il have vastly different agendas, he said.
A more likely scenario is one in which North Korea develops a shadowy proliferation network similar to that created by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, Carter said. Khan confessed in February 2004 to coordinating nuclear transfers for years to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Corruption in the North Korean regime is rampant and the potential for turning state assets toward personal gain is high, Carter said.