WASHINGTON -- Libya received an official "all clear" today from the U.N. agency investigating the nation's past efforts to develop a nuclear-weapon capability, ending a proliferation story that U.S. officials hope will be read closely by Iran and North Korea (see GSN, Sept. 8).
In a report circulated to the International Atomic Energy Agency's 35-nation governing board, agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei declared that his review is complete and that Tripoli does not pose a nuclear threat.
The IAEA investigation began after Libya publicly renounced all WMD activities in 2003 and invited the agency to verify the dismantlement of its nuclear programs. Those efforts included the purchase of key nuclear equipment and designs from an international nuclear smuggling network led by former Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see GSN, Aug. 11).
Today, ElBaradei reported "that the issues that had been reported to the Board of Governors are no longer outstanding at this stage." Future agency activities in Libya would be "a routine matter" of regularly confirming the absence of undeclared nuclear activities, he added.
In an apparent nudge to Iran, ElBaradei praised Libya for cooperating fully with IAEA inspectors.
"Libya has also provided the agency unrestricted and prompt access, beyond that required under its safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol, to those locations, information and individuals deemed necessary by the agency to fulfill its verification requirements," his report says.
The report reveals that Khan first met with Libyan officials in 1984, substantially earlier than previously known, said proliferation expert David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security.
"It shows that Khan was very determined to proliferate and his best customer was Libya," he said. "It reinforces the idea that he was a crook and a spy to begin with."
Detailed Chronology ReportedElBaradei's report offered the most comprehensive public account to date of Libya's past nuclear ambitions. Some highlights include:
--Libya first became interested in uranium enrichment in the early 1980s, meeting with Khan in 1984, but decided at the time that it did not have the resources to pursue the project. Officials nevertheless maintained occasional contact with Khan's network for the next decade.
--The Qadhafi government finally struck a deal with Khan in 1995 for Libya to purchase enrichment centrifuges, the first of which was tested in 2000. Libya planned to purchase 10,000 advanced centrifuges, although it only succeeded in installing and testing smaller numbers of less-sophisticated machines. Libyan officials have said that uranium was never introduced into the centrifuges.
--Libya also had interest in separating plutonium and received "substantial design information" for a plant that could annually produce about 10 kilograms of plutonium, more than enough for a nuclear weapon.
--The Khan network supplied Libya with nuclear-weapon design information in late 2001 or early 2002, but Tripoli apparently never acted on those documents. "Libya does not have the necessary capabilities to design or manufacture nuclear weapons components," ElBaradei's report says. "Nor did the agency find any indications of work related to nuclear weapons development."
Electronic DisseminationElBaradei expressed concern in the report that modern communications could create additional proliferation risks.
"Much of the sensitive information coming from the [Khan] network existed in electronic form, enabling easier use and dissemination. This includes information that relates to uranium centrifuge enrichment and, more disturbing, information that relates to nuclear-weapon design," he said. "Clearly, this is a matter of serious concern to the agency."