Analysts are questioning the significance of Iran's production of a metric ton of low-enriched uranium, a milestone that some experts have warned gives Tehran a "breakout capability" to produce nuclear weapons, Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported today (see GSN, Feb. 24).
(Feb. 25) -
Iranian technicians walk outside the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where preliminary tests began yesterday (Behrouz Mehri/Getty Images).
To convert lower-grade uranium to weapon-grade uranium, Iran would have to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ban International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from its nuclear facilities, run uranium through its enrichment centrifuges and then shape the material into hemispheres, according to Institute for Science and International Security head David Albright and other experts (see GSN, Feb. 20).
Iran, which has persistently denied having nuclear-weapon ambitions, would need at least two to six months to weaponize its declared uranium stockpile, giving other countries time to respond with diplomacy or force, said Andreas Persbo, an expert at the Verification Research, Training and Information Center in London.
"At the moment, I'm not very concerned," Persbo said.
Countries should instead concentrate on the potential for Iran to build and operate a secret uranium enrichment facility, said Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation.
Iran could acquire a nuclear deterrent without actually building a weapon, Albright added: "What if they just said they got the bomb? What are you gonna do?" (Albert Otti, Deutsche Presse-Agentur/Monsters and Critics, Feb. 25).
"It’s important and unwelcome that Iran is closer in time to having the capacity to enrich a bomb’s worth of uranium," George Perkovich, a nonproliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the Financial Times. "Once Iran gets nuclear-weapon capability, there is not that much to talk about,” he said.
Perkovich urged the international community to “put pressure on Iran to comply with legally binding demands on it to answer outstanding questions." Iran has refused to give the U.N. nuclear watchdog information that could clarify "possible military dimensions" to its atomic activities, according to the agency's latest report.
Iran has also worried experts by rejecting IAEA requests for details on its heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak. Once completed, the facility could provide another route to nuclear-weapon material (Daniel Dombey, Financial Times, Feb. 24).
In a speech to Congress last night, U.S. President Barack Obama reaffirmed Washington's intention to address nuclear proliferation threats through diplomacy.
"In words and deeds, we are showing the world that a new era of engagement has begun," Obama said "For we know that America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America. We cannot shun the negotiating table, nor ignore the foes or forces that could do us harm. We are instead called to move forward with the sense of confidence and candor that serious times demand."
"To meet the challenges of the 21st century -- from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from pandemic disease to cyber threats to crushing poverty -- we will strengthen old alliances, forge new ones, and use all elements of our national power," he added (Diane Barnes, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 25).
Meanwhile, Iran launched preliminary tests today at its Bushehr nuclear power plant, the New York Times reported. The would involve placing mock fuel rods in the Russian-built reactor, state media quoted officials as saying.
“Virtual fuel rods contain lead instead of uranium,” said Iranian Atomic Energy Organization deputy chief Mohammad Saeedi. “After these tests we can enter the launching process.”
The facility was in the “final stages before launching,” Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Director Sergei Kiriyenko said, but the sides did not yet have a "specific schedule" for testing the reactor with actual nuclear fuel (Fathi/Cowell, New York Times, Feb. 26).
The United States should offer formal ties to Iran in return for nuclear cooperation, former IAEA chief Hans Blix wrote in a London Guardian column published today.
"The U.S. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979. It seems likely that a prospect of such relations and of a place in regional discussions would offer Iran a greater incentive to reach a nuclear agreement than the Bush team's statements that 'Iran must behave itself,'" Blix wrote, noting that Washington and Tokyo have offered North Korea formal ties as part of a nuclear compromise.
"The demands that Iran should accept ever more inspection are meaningless," he added. "They are not made to help Iran show its lack of weapons intentions but in the hope that convincing incriminating evidence will be found. However, if such evidence is not found it will -- rightly -- be said that even if there were no intention today to move to bomb-making, Iran could change its mind next year.
"The key point at issue is not Iran's intentions but its development of an industrial-scale capability to enrich uranium. Once such capability exists -- whether in Iran, Egypt, Turkey or Indonesia -- the country would be a shorter time away from a bomb if it wanted to make one. The further countries in sensitive regions are from that capability the better," Blix stated.
"Years have been lost to ineffective approaches. Europeans and backseat-driving Americans have demanded that Iran must suspend its enrichment program before they are ready to dignify the country with direct negotiations. As Iran has simply continued to develop the program it is Europe, not Iran, that has become eager for negotiations.
"Iran has invested resources and prestige in its enrichment program. Can it walk away from it? Well, it would not be the first in the world to abandon nuclear plants. Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty there is a right to enrich, but there is no duty to use the right.
"Iran must weigh costs and benefits. It must be aware that buying uranium fuel would be less costly than producing it, and that forgoing such production would be compensated by strong international fuel-supply assurances. And finally, it must be aware that enrichment in Iran might lead to enrichment in other Middle East countries," Blix wrote (London Guardian, Feb. 25).