WASHINGTON -- The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty could be effectively brought into force despite North Korea's repeated nuclear tests and continued intransigence on the global stage, experts say (see GSN, June 1).
(Jun. 4) -
A 1957 nuclear test in Nevada. A global ban on nuclear tests could provisionally be entered into force without North Korea's consent, according to experts (Nevada Environmental Protection Division photo).
North Korea is among 44 nations that must ratify the treaty before it can be applied, and the only nation today that is known to have conducted nuclear tests in the past decade -- most recently on May 25. Many nonproliferation experts predict that the Stalinist state will be the last nation to sign or ratify the agreement.
U.S. President Barack Obama has made CTBT ratification a major component of his nuclear disarmament agenda. Should the administration persuade the U.S. Senate to sign off on his plan, Washington could provide an example for the eight other holdouts to follow, experts said.
"The president has stated his intent to immediately and aggressively pursue Senate advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT, well before the recent [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] actions. This already represented a high level of motivation, which has not changed," a U.S. State Department spokesman stated Monday e-mail message.
The question, ultimately, could be what to do about Pyongyang, which has conducted two nuclear tests and might be preparing for further explosions (see GSN, June 3).
"The brutal fact is that North Korea will be outside of all global efforts because of their own internal reasons for going the nuclear route," according to John Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He described the Asian nation as the "big elephant in the room" in all nuclear nonproliferation discussions.
Park noted that Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear test as consensus has begun to form around ratification of the pact that would prohibit all member states from conducting nuclear test blasts. While that coincidence should not be ignored "it should not hinder the ongoing efforts to get the CTBT ratified," he said.
"The CTBT is one of the best ways to further reinforce the norm against nuclear test explosions," said Daryl Kimball, head of the Arms Control Association.
Kimball argued that while it is "technically" correct to say that Pyongyang must sign and ratify the treaty before it can enter into force, there are ways to enact the agreement's verification regime without North Korea's involvement.
"If, in the end, we have 43 of the 44 states listed and North Korea is the last holdout state, there are options that are available or can be created," he told Global Security Newswire last week.
For instance, state parties could convene and agree that the treaty would enter into force on a "provisional basis," Kimball said.
The idea of the agreement entering into force without ratification by the 44 "Annex 2" nations has been broached before. In its 2006 final report to the United Nations, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission recommended that the 2007 conference of CTBT signatories address "the possibility of a provisional entry into force of the treaty."
Kimball noted that while the treaty does not specifically provide for such an action, states could argue it is not a legal decision but a "practical decision to use the existing verification and monitoring systems." The treaty's International Monitoring System now employs 130 primary seismic stations and 22 systems within its noble gas network to detect and establish the character of a nuclear test.
A decision to enter into force on a provisional basis could require the United States and others to sign a political document or multiparty executive agreement that would codify the move, according to Kimball.
If the test ban treaty does not come into force, member states could "agree to act as if it did," Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, told GSN. That would reinforce the existing unilateral prohibitions many countries already observe and open the door for on-site inspections in the case of an "ambiguous event," he said. He did not say if it would allow the CTBT Organization to officially take shape.
Lewis said such an agreement could begin with the recognized nuclear powers -- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States -- and then expand to include other states.
"It's a reasonable scenario that in eight years the CTBT has entered into force or at least entered into force among the majority of nuclear-weapon states," Lewis said.
A spokeswoman for the Preparatory Commission for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization declined to comment on the possibility of the agreement entering into force without Pyongyang's signature and ratification.
Park suggested "one massive footnote" be added to future nuclear nonproliferation treaties that would acknowledge North Korea without including the reclusive state. The footnote would point out that Pyongyang is on the path toward becoming a nuclear power and reaffirm a policy of engagement, dubbing the country a "work in progress," but one that does not hinder future collective efforts at significant nuclear arms reduction.
Ratification by Other States
Kimball said ratification by the United States could lead China to do the same and place a spotlight on remaining holdout states Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and India. He noted that Tehran's continued refusal to ratify the treaty would provide the internal community greater insight into that country's nuclear motives and "suggest more strongly its nuclear program is not for peaceful purposes after all."
"The argument is basically over; [the United States is] not going to resume yield testing," according to Lewis. The challenge facing the Obama administration "is finding the right combination of pieces that will make people feel better about having changed their vote" when the treaty comes before the Senate for a vote.
Lawmakers could add language that would allow future administrations to conduct "periodic reviews" of the treaty every five or 10 years to determine if the pact is still in the country's national security interests, according to Lewis.
Lewis said there is a two-thirds chance that the United States will ratify the treaty within the next two years and a 95 percent chance China likely will follow suit. In that scenario, there is a 50 percent chance India would ratify; Pakistan would then do the same, making Israel "an easy get," according to Lewis.
Others remain wary of the compact's prospects for ratification by the United States.
There could be "tough sledding" for Obama if he follows through on his arms control commitment, Arnold Kanter, a founding member of the Scowcroft Group, said during a May 27 panel discussion at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States failed to reach a consensus on whether the country should ratify the test ban treaty, according to Kanter, who served as undersecretary of state during U.S. President George H.W. Bush's administration.
While the United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for nearly 20 years, convincing other countries to ratify the agreement remains a "formidable challenge" as each has its own security concerns, he said.
Kanter, who favors ratifying the test ban treaty with the periodic review caveat, said he knows there are multiple arguments against doing so, including that other countries might "cheat" on the agreement for military gain, but that he finds none of them "compelling."