WASHINGTON -- The U.N. Security Council today unanimously adopted a new resolution to punish North Korea for its latest nuclear blast (see GSN, June 11).
(Jun. 12) -
The U.N. Security Council today unanimously endorsed a new sanctions resolution against North Korea for conducting another nuclear test (Don Emmert/Getty Images).
Resolution 1874, submitted Wednesday by the United States and six other U.N. member states, condemns Pyongyang's May 25 nuclear test and imposes a set of trade and financial sanctions intended to put North Korea back on a diplomatic track toward nuclear disarmament.
The new resolution includes an increased call for inspections of cargo suspected of containing items related to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile activities, a tighter arms embargo and new financial restrictions. It also demands North Korea to fully comply with U.N. Security Resolution 1718, which was passed after the regime's first nuclear test in October 2006.
Today's resolution "sends a message that North Korea's behavior is unacceptable to the international community," U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said moments after the 15-0 vote.
Yesterday a top U.S. diplomat yesterday called on U.N. member states to fully enact the new round of sanctions.
"Sanctions resolutions are useful and important largely to the extent to which they are implemented," Stephen Bosworth, special representative for North Korea policy at the U.S. State Department, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Full compliance with the new resolution "will be a very important part to our response to what North Korea is doing," Bosworth said.
North Korea in recent months has displayed an increasingly confrontational attitude toward the international community. In April it seemingly tested long-range missile technology and shortly thereafter pledged to resume plutonium reprocessing. On May 25, the regime conducted its second underground nuclear test, an action that spurred drafting of the new resolution. Pyongyang also has fired several short-range missiles and reports indicate it is gearing up for further missile tests.
After the North's first nuclear test in October 2006, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1718, which barred Pyongyang from conducting or launching any kind of ballistic missile. That resolution also ordered the North Korean government to suspend its ballistic missile and nuclear programs and imposed a host of financial sanctions on the country.
However, many of the provisions have been largely ignored by the international community. Bosworth said Resolution 1718 failed because six-nation negotiations on the North's nuclear program resumed within weeks of its passage, deflating international political momentum.
The new resolution would impose "unprecedented measures" on North Korea, he said, including: a total ban on arms exports and a "major expansion" of the prohibition on arms imports; new financial sanctions to limit Pyongyang's ability to fund its WMD and ballistic missile programs; a voluntary inspection regime by U.N. states for North Korean ships suspected of carrying "prescribed goods;" and designation of new entities that would face sanctions, Bosworth said.
When asked might happen if the latest round of proposed sanctions illicit a provocative response from Pyongyang, Bosworth responded, "We are prepared to respond appropriately." He declined to elaborate.
"The United States will do what is necessary to do to defend U.S. national security and the national security of our allies" in the region, he said.
Experts debated the potential value of the latest round of sanctions the day before Bosworth testified before lawmakers.
"The effectiveness of these kinds of resolutions depends upon international and national political dynamics. It depends upon each country's own legal and administrative authorities to enforce these resolutions. And it depends upon their enforcement capacity," William Newcomb, a former senior economic adviser to the Intelligence and Analysis Office at the U.S. Treasury Department, said during a panel discussion at the U.S. Institute of Peace on Wednesday.
Pyongyang has learned from the previous round of sanctions and devised "countermeasures" that would reduce the effect of the proposed resolution, he said. Newcomb did not say what those countermeasures might entail.
The resolution is essentially an enhanced version of Resolution 1718, encompassing the earlier document's "broad characteristics" on inspections of cargo on the high seas and stopping the flow of arms, Charles Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute, said at same event.
However, it "boils down to the effectiveness of these measures and whether or not the countries will enforce them," according to Pritchard, who served as special envoy for negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the Bush administration. "That's not certain at all."
Of particular concern will be how closely China adheres to the sanctions. Beijing supplies North Korea with 90 percent of its fuel and a huge proportion of other essential goods, the Los Angeles Times reported this week. It has generally been reluctant to impose harsh punishments on the North, for fear of creating an unstable situation in the neighboring state.
"It's very fair to say that we found China very concerned, acutely concerned, about what North Korea is doing," said Bosworth, who visited China and other Asian nations in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test.
Any new resolution should contain "provisions of requirement" that spell out what each member nation's obligations are, how states will enforce sanctions and what, if any, consequences there might be for not applying them, according to Pritchard.
On a "theoretical basis," he said, if the new financial sanctions are implemented and prove effective there is a risk of "stifling or delaying" economic reform in North Korea. However, the measures should still be enacted, he said.
Pritchard suggested the writers of future U.N. resolutions create a "safety valve" or "return ramp" that would allow North Korea to "find a way out" of sanctions and mollify Chinese concerns that the sanctions are about economic punishment rather than bringing Pyongyang back to the six-party nuclear talks.
The former ambassador said there would need to be a "robust review process" in which the U.N. Security Council could decide which penalties should be sustained and which could be suspended based on North Korean activity.
Pritchard also advocated a system of transparent accounting that holds member nations up to public scrutiny, saying the sanctions committee could publish lists of countries that have complied with the latest measures and what their compliance has entailed.
Financial sanctions could lead Pyongyang to "lash out,"analyst Victor Cha, who served as director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council during the Bush administration, said during the panel discussion. He said that some experts believe the Bush administration's successful application of such measures directly led to North Korea's first nuclear test explosion in October 2006.
Bosworth said he was hopeful for a resumption of the six-party talks, which included the United States, China, Japan, both Koreas and Russia. Negotiations produced a 2007 North Korean denuclearization agreement and some progress toward that goal, but stalled late last year. Pyongyang said it would no longer participate in the talks after being condemned for its April rocket launch.
"There is no evidence they are prepared to do that now but I believe they will eventually come back to the table," the special envoy told lawmakers.
Pritchard refused to speculate what "Plan B" might be if the latest resolution fails to bring Pyongyang back to the multilateral talks.
If financial sanctions fail other countries in the region could accept the idea that a nuclear North Korea "may be more than a temporary reality," Cha said. They might then increase demands for extended deterrence guarantees from the United States.
Cha said that if North Korea does not rejoin the talks that there are opportunities for enhanced missile defense cooperation with Japan and South Korea. He said that "Plan B" implies "something more out the box" in terms of a solution, adding the United States could try to influence the outcome of Pyongyang's leadership transition through "direct engagement." Cha said that if he were still in government he "wouldn't advocate that."
If multilateral talks do resume, the United Stated must get "higher up" into the North Korean decision-making structure, according to Cha. He said that it was clear from his own experiences at the negotiating table that the North Korea representatives were not "nimble" enough and had to wait on orders from Pyongyang.
Cha said the United States must also be willing to walk away from the talks. When that tactic was used in the past the North Koreans "always called back," he said.
Most importantly, it will be important for the United States and others to show "political will and patience" in negotiations as it serves a dual purpose of building a coalition for "Plan B" if the talks fall apart. That way "no one can blame U.S. policy anymore."