Iran stopped increasing the count of operational centrifuges at its Natanz facility roughly three months ago following a gradual, three-year expansion of uranium enrichment at the site, Reuters reported today (see GSN, Aug. 24).
(Aug. 25) -
Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment complex, shown in 2005. Diplomats said that Tehran has stopped increasing the number of operational centrifuges at the site for the first time in three years (Getty Images).
The United States and other Western powers suspect that Iran's uranium enrichment program is geared toward producing nuclear-weapon material; they have threatened to pursue new sanctions against the Middle Eastern state if it does not agree by the end of September to join multilateral talks aimed at halting the effort. Tehran has maintained it would only use the enrichment process to produce nuclear power plant fuel.
"There has been no increase in the number of centrifuges enriching uranium since the end of May," said one high-level diplomat based in Vienna, where the International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to release a report this week on its ongoing probe into Iran's nuclear ambitions.
In June, IAEA officials believed Iran was operating nearly 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges at Natanz, with another 2,100 ready to go operational. Since that time, the nation has installed additional centrifuges that it has not begun to run.
"Once they're installed, it only takes a few weeks to test-run them under vacuum before they're ready to enrich," said David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security.
Technical obstacles have probably prevented Iran from further expanding its enrichment capacity, some diplomats and other specialists said, referring to Tehran's unwavering refusal to consider formal limits on the program.
One analyst, though, suggested that Tehran slowed its production of low-enriched uranium after concluding that its stockpile was "perilously close to crossing an Israeli red line." Jerusalem has suggested it could launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in an attempt to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.
"In the meantime, what's most important for Iran is to increase the number of installed centrifuges, in case it ever enters negotiations that require a freeze on their number. Adding to the numbers now creates additional 'facts on the ground' that it will later argue can never be rolled back," added Mark Fitzpatrick, a nonproliferation expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (Westall/Heinrich, Reuters, Aug. 25).
Analysts believe the Obama administration is preparing to deter Iran from employing nuclear weapons if the nation manages to acquire them, National Public Radio reported today.
"I don't think this is a suicidal regime. I don't dismiss out of hand at all the idea that they could be deterred," said former U.S. Deputy National Intelligence Director Thomas Fingar.
"The alternatives to deterrence are what, after all? There's not a lot there. We tried preventative war in the case of Iraq. This turned out to have costs and difficulty that were not entertained at the outset. Most people believe that in the case of Iran, those costs and difficulties would be considerably greater," Joshua Pollack, a nuclear weapons expert who contributes to the ArmsControlWonk blog.
"[The Iranians] know that if they, for example, attack Israel, the Israelis and the United States would have the capability to completely destroy Iran and in the process completely destroy the regime," added Muhammad Sahimi, an Iran expert at the University of Southern California.
"Whatever they may build, everything that they may build would be for the survival of the regime against foreign attack," Sahimi said.
The United States successfully deterred nuclear-armed foes during the Cold War, noted Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
"Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin make [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad look like a Boy Scout. And I'm not belittling the worrisome nature of Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime. But we have dealt with far, far worse," Krepon said.
Even if it does not use its arsenal in combat, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose unique threats to other nations in the region, warned Gary Milhollin, head of the Wisconsin Project on Arms Control.
"If Iran gets the bomb, we're going to have a period of experimentation in the beginning, where Iran is trying to figure out how much power this new capability has conferred," Milhollin said.
Aggressive rhetoric from Jerusalem, Washington and Tehran could produce a major conflict between the countries, he suggested.
"At that point, you're stepping into the unknown. And I think it would be very risky to assume that a combination of containment and deterrence would be adequate to protect us," Milhollin said.
Iran's shrinking supply of unrefined uranium ore would likely prevent it from building more than a few nuclear weapons, experts said (Mike Shuster, National Public Radio I, Aug. 25).
Military action against Iranian nuclear facilities would probably incorporate an series of strikes over an extended period of time, former top U.S. officials told NPR.
"If we decide that we have to use force, I think we would go with the broader option -- attack more facilities," said Jeffrey White, a former head of Middle East intelligence for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
"(An attack by Israel) might actually be a way out for the Obama administration. I'm not saying they're encouraging it. But, if the Israelis conducted a successful attack, it would take a lot of the pressure off the administration," White said.
"From a military standpoint, this would be a sustained activity over a period of time, more like weeks and months than days," added retired Air Force Gen. Charles Wald.
"This is a viable option. Whether it's desirable or going to be doable, that's something else. But we have an option. Now, does anybody in their right mind want to attack Iran? No, not a bit. But sometimes you (have to) do things you don't like to do," Wald said.
"Iran is a strong state. It's a very large state. It would surely strike back," said former U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, a top Iran negotiator during the second Bush administration. "And if it struck back, we might end up with a third war in the Middle East and South Asia, after Afghanistan and Iraq. Can we handle a third war?" (Mary Louise Kelly, National Public Radio II, Aug. 24).
Meanwhile, an Israeli official yesterday leveled new criticism at IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei for allegedly withholding information from his agency's Iran investigation, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Aug. 19).
The U.N. nuclear watchdog chief "has been quite negligent in revealing all the difficulties that the monitors have in Iran and also in not exposing the full picture of the deception and acceleration of (its) illegal military nuclear activities," the official said.
"There is here a dereliction of duty against the mandate" of the IAEA chief, the official contended. "His attitude has always been ... quite duplicitous during his entire tenure" (Agence France-Presse/Google News, Aug. 24).
The Nonaligned Movement supports an Iranian proposal for an IAEA resolution that would prohibit military strikes against the nuclear facilities of other countries, the Tehran Times reported today (see GSN, May 13).
Egypt, the current holder of the multilateral organization's rotating presidency, reportedly expressed the group's support for the proposal submitted to ElBaradei yesterday.
“The support of over 100 countries for Iran’s vital, comprehensive, and timely proposal shows that the country plays a significant role in all matters in the International Atomic Energy Agency," Iranian Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Ali Asghar Soltanieh said (Tehran Times, Aug. 25).