WASHINGTON -- In order to truly abolish the threats posed by nuclear weapons the international community must take steps to safeguard or eliminate the fissile materials used in both military and civilian sectors, according to a recently released experts report (see GSN, Dec. 11).
(Dec. 14) -
Containers used by the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program for transportation and storage of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons. States must work to eliminate such materials in order to wipe out the threats posed by nuclear weapons, a report says (Nuclear Threat Initiative photo).
"If nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, the plutonium and [highly enriched uranium] in the nuclear-weapon complex, the HEU used to fuel the nuclear reactors that power over a hundred ships and submarines and over a hundred nuclear research reactors around the world, and the stock of civilian plutonium separated from nuclear-power-reactor spent fuel will have to be secured, placed under internal monitoring and, to the extent possible, eliminated," according to the Global Fissile Material Report 2009.
The 189-page document, released in October, is the fourth annual report prepared by the International Panel on Fissile Materials.
The danger posed by the materials, which sustain the explosive chain reaction within a nuclear bomb, was highlighted in U.S. President Barack Obama's nonproliferation speech in April.
Speaking in Prague, he said that establishing a fissile material cutoff treaty -- which could establish a legal, verifiable ban on production of weapons substances -- would be one of the "concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons."
"To cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile material intended for use in state nuclear weapons," the president said. "If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons grade materials that create them. That's the first step" (see GSN, April 6).
In May, the panel presented a draft treaty that addressed the definition, verification, implementation and organization issues associated with such a pact (see GSN, May 12).
The five nuclear powers designated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States -- observe a self-imposed moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons.
There is uncertainty surrounding other nuclear arsenal holders India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, according to Zia Mian, a scholar at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security and a contributor to the report.
India is producing highly enriched uranium to power vessels in its new nuclear submarine fleet, he said during a presentation of the report last week on Capitol Hill.
There is today a worldwide stockpile of about 1,600 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 500 metric tons of separated plutonium, the report states. Roughly 900 tons of that uranium and 150 tons of the plutonium are in nuclear warheads and associated production facilities, the document says.
About half of the existing stockpile of separated plutonium is used for civilian purposes, Mian said.
As Russia and the United States work to reduce their nuclear caches the amount of unemployed plutonium and highly enriched uranium begins to "dwarf" that left in the warheads, he said. Therefore, "from a point of view of nuclear disarmament, this becomes increasingly a category of material that needs to be controlled," Mian told the audience.
The elimination of all existing fissile materials and a ban on their production would curb nuclear proliferation among nations and reduce the likelihood that terrorists could acquire a devastating weapon, the panel claimed.
A verifiable treaty that ends all production of fissile materials for weapons would be a "valuable and important contribution" to the international community's nuclear-disarmament regime, said James Acton, an associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
One challenge to this idea is that "there's no state that knows exactly how much fissile material it has," according to Acton.
"If there is to be verifiable disarmament in North Korea you need to know much fissile material there" is, he said. "If you want to prevent nuclear terrorism then you need to know how much fissile material states have."
The nuclear weapons states know how much fissile material they possess in their military programs, according to Alexander Glaser, a scholar at Princeton's Program on Science and Global Security.
Acton said there are questions about how to "control" the materials so they are not diverted to weapons programs. He argued that a robust cutoff treaty would include transparency measures like stockpile declarations and verification of "some types" of fissile materials stocks, such as those used for civilian and research efforts.
As a first step, a declaration could be made of total holdings of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the panel's report says. However, better initial declarations would include: the number of warheads, warhead components and associated "working stocks"; material that has been determined unnecessary for military purposes but is still in weapons; reserves for navy and other military-reactor use; spent military-reactor fuel; and civilian stocks.
Verification would come from actual measurements of available material and production facilities.
Previous stockpile reporting by the United Kingdom and the United States proves "you can make these declarations without the sky falling," according to Glaser. He noted that some states might be embarrassed to make such a statement because they could realize they are missing quantities or do not have as much as they previously claimed.
The United States announced its plutonium stockpile in 1996 and its highly enriched uranium stockpile in 2001, though the details were not released until 2006 due to security concerns, he said. The country now holds nearly 600 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and roughly 92 metric tons of separated plutonium, according to the new report.
Declarations would provide confidence in the disarmament process even without a verification regime in place as governments and international agencies would be able to examine the consistency of the announcement and cross-check it with intelligence or publicly available information, Glaser told the audience.
It is "critical states start the process of preparing these declarations today even if they're not planning to make the information public at this point," he said.
If a fissile material cutoff treaty with an inspection protocol is eventually created the announcements could serve as a road map for future on-site inspections of production and storage sites, according to Glaser.
He also said the United States should strengthen the Energy Department's Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System -- which maintains an inventory of nuclear materials -- and encourage other states to develop similar reporting programs.
While the United States is "well positioned" to lead the way on transparency and verification, it should move to reinvigorate several programs designed to eliminate fissile materials, said Princeton public and international affairs professor Frank von Hippel, co-chairman of the study group.
For example, the "Megatons to Megawatts" program to demilitarize bomb-grade uranium -- taken from dismantled Soviet-era nuclear warheads --for use in civil nuclear power plants is set to expire in 2013. Thus far, Washington has not reached an agreement with the Kremlin to extend the effort, he said. The program has eliminated 15,000 warheads to date, according to the United States Enrichment Corp.